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There are many lessons from the 
past several years that are changing 
the way the U.S. defense establish-
ment operates. The purpose of this 
short essay is to highlight some of 
those changes and foster discussion 
about how they will impact the future 
of warfare. Understandably, the first 
question many might ask is “why 
would a judge advocate—a lawyer—
be addressing this topic?” The answer 
reflects one of the most important 
changes I will discuss. Law and order 
plays an ever larger role in military 
operations, certainly more so than at 
any other time in history. As General 
James Jones, then the commander of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO), famously observed in 
a 2003 Parade magazine article that 
to go to war today, you “have to have 
a lawyer or a dozen. It’s become very 
legalistic and very complex.”1
Indeed, the most devastating set-
back in the entire war in Iraq involved 
not force of arms, but law, more 
specifically illegalities. I am speak-
ing of Abu Ghraib. Lt. Gen. Ricardo 
Sanchez, then the senior American 
commander in Iraq, rightly used cus-
tomary military terminology in saying 
that the lawlessness of Abu Ghraib 
was “clearly a defeat.”2 The effect was 
indistinguishable from a conventional 
military disaster.
In today’s world, Clausewitz’s 
maxim that war is a continuation of 
politics by other means has a distinct 
legal flavor. We increasingly find that 
our adversaries’ principal means of 
trying to counteract the superior-
ity of our equipment—airpower, for 
example—is to claim we are using it 
illegally in some way.
This has had an effect on our 
procurement. Some weaponry, such 
as the Small Diameter Bomb, was 
explicitly developed to help minimize 
collateral damage so as to limit the 
enemy’s opportunity to propagandize 
such incidents.3 Billions of dollars 
worth of intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR) assets are 
being brought to bear for this purpose 
as well.
Meanwhile, leaders today read-
ily seek advice from nontraditional 
sources, particularly when they pro-
vide what they need to hear, versus 
what they want to hear. These days an 
overly enthusiastic “can-do” attitude 
can prove disastrous if it causes the 
staff to be less than candid with the 
decision maker. Candid advice, even 
when unwelcome, is the military law-
yer’s stock and trade.
Different perspectives are useful. 
Lawyers are trained to dispassionately 
scrutinize contentions, analyze data, 
and effectively articulate a range of 
solutions sensitive to the political di-
mension that pervades national secu-
rity matters today. This is what senior 
decision makers really need.
Other nontraditional advisers 
are also proving valuable. A striking 
example is the development of the 
much-heralded Army and Marine 
Corps counterinsurgency manual.4 
In drafting what has proved to be 
a bestseller, the Army cleverly as-
sembled what one writer called an 
“odd fraternity” of experts including 
“representatives of human rights 
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nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), international organizations, 
academic experts, civilian agency rep-
resentatives, [and even] journalists.”5 
Although I have critiqued parts of the 
manual, this is one aspect that I think 
was sheer genius, and a model for de-
velopment of government policy.
Even the widest range of exper-
tise, however, cannot definitively 
predict the future. To restate Presi-
dent Dwight Eisenhower’s dictum, 
“Every war is going to astonish you 
in the way it has occurred and in the 
way it is carried out.”6 Although most 
people would agree that we need to 
be prepared to conduct operations 
across the full spectrum of conflict, 
there is real debate as to where the 
weight of the effort ought to go. Col-
umnist Jim Hoagland probably went 
too far recently in characterizing 
these discussions as “The War at the 
Pentagon,” but it is true that there are 
diverse and strongly held opinions on 
the subject. 7
Plenty of experts insist that we are 
in an era of persistent conflict. Such 
conflict, the thinking goes, will take 
place in failing or failed states and will 
often involve nonstate actors employ-
ing nontraditional means. This is no 
doubt true, but, in my opinion, the 
problem arises when people insist 
that war with peer and near-peer 
competitors is unlikely, and there-
fore, the overwhelming focus of the 
U.S. military should be to prepare to 
conduct operations at the low end of 
the spectrum.
This is not to suggest that such 
operations do not deserve to be given 
resources. They do, and indeed are, to 
a very high degree. According to the 
Department of Defense (DoD), the 
92,000-troop increase in Army and 
Marine forces over five years is “an 
adaptation [for today’s] prolonged, 
irregular type of campaign.”8 Addi-
tionally, the DoD reportedly is plan-
ning to spend $22 billion to acquire 
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
(MRAP) vehicles, which are mostly 
limited to counterinsurgency situa-
tions. 9
Surprising to me, one expert 
says (and others may agree) that for 
America in the next decade, “colossal 
boots-on-the-ground efforts are not 
only possible, they also are likely.”10 
Given America’s experience in Iraq, I 
am not so sure. Despite the real suc-
cess there over the past year, a recent 
poll found that 62 percent of Ameri-
cans still think that the United States 
should have stayed out of Iraq.11
In any event, we must do more 
than just assess the likelihood of con-
flict occurring at a particular point 
on the spectrum; we must also cal-
culate the magnitude of the potential 
loss.12 Thus, in making decisions in a 
resource-limited environment, strat-
egists ought to distinguish carefully 
between extremely dangerous threats 
and the genuinely existential ones.
There can be no doubt that in 
an interconnected, globalized world, 
what happens in a failing state impacts 
U.S. interests. It is also unquestionably 
true that terrorists and other nonstate 
actors who operate in such a state 
could cause horrifying harm to this 
country, especially if they obtained 
one or more weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMDs). Nevertheless, I would 
argue that only peer-competitor 
nations have the ability to end the 
existence of the United States. Among 
other things, only a nation-state could 
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acquire—and deliver to our shores—
WMD in sufficient numbers and so-
phistication to destroy our country.
Therefore we must first and fore-
most be absolutely certain that we 
have done everything possible to 
prevent such a terminal catastrophe. 
We must be able to deter and, if neces-
sary, have the conventional means to 
defeat adversaries able to wage war at 
the high end of the spectrum. Thus, 
even if one accepts that the likelihood 
of a peer-competitor war is small, the 
magnitude of the potential loss is just 
too great to make national security de-
cisions simply based on the expected 
frequency of conflicts where the stakes 
are not as great.
For a number of reasons, I believe, 
to paraphrase an axiom attributed to 
Plato, that “only the dead have seen 
the end of war between peer-com-
petitor, nation-states.” Yet too many 
people—including young officers who 
seem captured by their experiences in 
today’s conflicts—are convinced that 
tomorrow’s wars will be some replay 
of Iraq or Afghanistan.
Dealing with this conundrum 
brings us to the importance of find-
ing ways to prevent the next failed 
state. The military calls this “Phase 
Zero” operations—that is, efforts 
aimed at stabilizing a country before 
it collapses. I certainly would count 
myself among those who would like 
to see the capabilities of the military’s 
interagency partners become stronger. 
For example, the secretary of defense 
has repeatedly made the point that 
better funding of foreign affairs is in 
our national security interest.13 Few in 
uniform would disagree.
Of course, the military also has 
Phase Zero responsibilities. Indeed, 
the DoD declared in 2005 that “Stabil-
ity operations are a core U.S. military 
mission that . . . shall be given priority 
comparable to combat operations.”14 
But given our tradition of civilian 
control of the military and our respect 
for the free enterprise system, there is 
something disquieting about deploy-
ing America’s most authoritarian and 
socialistic arm, our armed forces, to 
teach struggling foreign countries how 
to build social, political, economic, 
educational, and other democratic 
institutions. I would much prefer 
civilians—even contractors—to be the 
face of America in those situations.
Along those lines, if we are talk-
ing about nonmilitary instruments 
that might help us avoid future war, 
consider the president’s clean energy 
initiatives.15 The development of eco-
friendly alternative fuels technologies, 
if shared with the rest of the world, 
may be among the most fruitful na-
tional security investments possible.
The pendulum has swung too far 
in denigrating the value of technology 
in war. In some quarters, belittling 
the role of high technology has be-
come the sport of choice. Anything 
that smacks of high-tech war fight-
ing is ridiculed as “legacy” or “Cold 
War” thinking. I fully appreciate the 
dangerous potential of low-tech war. 
In 1996, I wrote a cover story for the 
Weekly Standard entitled “How We 
Lost the High-Tech War of 2007.”16 
In that fictionalized piece, I warned 
against adversaries who would use 
terrorism and other asymmetric 
techniques to defeat an overly high-
tech U.S. military. Likewise, in a 1998 
essay, I warned of enemies using 
airliners as asymmetric weapons.17 
Today, however, we are at risk of 
overcorrecting and dangerously un-
dervaluing high technology.
Historians Ronald Haycock and 
Keith Neilson make an important 
point: “Technology has permitted the 
division of mankind into ruler and 
ruled.”18 Technology is part of our 
culture; it is, in fact, our asymmetric 
advantage. Recently, strategic theorist 
Colin Gray noted, “High technology 
is the American way in warfare. It has 
to be. A high technology society can-
not possibly prepare for, or attempt 
to fight, its wars in any other than a 
technology-led manner.”19
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Some underrate technology be-
cause they are drawing the wrong 
lessons from history. For example, in 
writing the new counterinsurgency 
manual, the drafters relied heavily on 
lessons learned from insurgencies of 
the 1950s to 1970s. These were eras 
when, significantly, high technology 
generally, and airpower specifically, 
had little to offer. Hence, it is no sur-
prise that the discussion of airpower in 
the 2006 counterinsurgency manual is 
limited to a five-page annex, and that 
short discussion is leery of airpower 
out of fear of collateral damage.
Ironically, current precision air 
weaponry, especially the new intel-
ligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance (ISR) platforms, have produced 
what retired Army General Barry 
McCaffrey insists is “a 100-year war-
fighting leap-ahead” that has “fun-
damentally changed the nature of 
warfare.”20 The result? Human Rights 
Watch activist Marc Garlasoc recently 
conceded that he thinks “airstrikes 
probably are the most discriminating 
weapon that exists.”21
Equally important, today’s in-
surgent is not low tech. In a recent 
article, retired Army officer John 
Sutherland invented the word iGuer-
rilla for what he describes as the “the 
New Model Techno-Insurgent” who 
exploits technology in a wide variety 
of ways.22 Sutherland argues that the 
iGuerrilla “cannot be swayed by logic 
or argument” and insists this kind 
of insurgent is markedly different 
from those of the twentieth century 
who, he contends, are relegated to 
the “dustbin of history.” Yet much of 
our current doctrine is premised on 
twentieth-century insurgents.
To me, this risks missing the 
opportunity to exploit technological 
opportunities. We may be reaching 
the tipping point where the research 
and development capabilities of 
the nation-state can significantly 
exceed the abilities of an adversary 
dependent on improvising from 
off-the-shelf technologies. Further, 
iGuerrillas, I submit, are growing up 
addicted to the Internet, cell phones, 
PDAs (personal digital assistants), 
electronic transfers, credit cards, 
and other technological artifacts of 
globalized society. Therein lies a huge 
vulnerability. Anything that emits 
or connects to an emitter brings us 
closer to General Ron Fogelman’s 
prediction in 2000 that we will be 
able to “find, fix or track, and target 
anything that moves on the surface 
of the Earth.”23
This brings us to our final point: 
we need to look for ways to substi-
tute machines for the boots of young 
Americans wherever possible. This 
is emphatically not a call for smaller 
numbers of the superb ground forces 
in our military. The point is that we 
need to provide decision makers with 
options that can minimize the need for 
U.S. troops to go in harm’s way.
Leveraging technology will have 
to play decisively in the answer. We 
should favor equipment that is useful 
across the whole spectrum of conflict. 
A quick illustration: air strikes in Iraq 
increased fivefold in 2007 over 2006.24 
Perhaps equally or, probably, more 
important, is the almost unbelievable 
growth in ISR, particularly in un-
manned aerial platforms that General 
McCaffrey references. 25
I would suggest that the marriage 
of persistent ISR with precision-strike 
capability is the single most important 
military equipment innovation of the 
decade thus far. Unsurprisingly, recent 
reports name ISR assets as General 
Petraeus’ “top hardware priority in 
Iraq.”26 These developments, facilitated 
by advances in command, control, and 
communications, have turned such 
warplanes as B–52s and B–1s, as well 
as a range of fighter aircraft, into close 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t o
f D
ef
en
se
21
air support platforms equally able to 
strike a single insurgent in an urban 
setting, or attack a high-tech armored 
brigade charging across a plain.
I am not advocating airpower-
only or even airpower-centric solu-
tions. I am just pointing out that this 
is one area where capabilities that have 
tremendous value in irregular war 
also can be flexibly employed at any 
level of conflict. There are certainly 
other technologies out there that have 
similar utility; the Army’s satellite-
guided Excalibur artillery round is 
one example.27
The bottom line is that we must 
have a full-spectrum military that 
recognizes the gravity of peer-com-
petitor war, that leverages our tech-
nological inclinations, and that 
operates in a genuinely joint and 
independent way. As Billy Mitchell 
put it, “Nations nearly always go into 
an armed contest with the equipment 
and methods of a former war. Victory 
always comes to that country which 
has made a proper estimate of the 
equipment and methods that can be 
used in modern ways.”28
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